Constructing the Self analyzes the narrative conception of self, filling a serious gap in philosophy and grounding discussion in other disciplines. It answers the questions: • What are the connections between our interpretations, selfhood, and conscious phenomenal experience? • Why do we believe that our interpretations of our life-defining events are narrative in nature? • From the myriad of thoughts, actions, and emotions which constitute our experiences, how do we choose what is interpretively important, the tiny subset that composes the self? By synthesizing the different approaches to understanding the self from philosophy of mind, developmental psychology, psychopathology, and cognitive science, this monograph gives us deeper insight into what being minded, being a person, and having a self are, as well as clarifies the difference and relation between conscious and unconscious mental states and normal and abnormal minds. The explication also affords new perspectives on human development and human emotion. (Series A) On Being A Person -- Personhood -- Re-identification -- Characterization -- Whither Narrativity -- Persons Vs. Selves Redux -- Against Narrativity -- Clive And The Pirahã : Narrative Counter-examples? -- Self Stories -- A Brief And Skewed Primer On Narratology -- The Point Of Nonliterary Nonfiction -- The Structure Of Self Narratives -- The Function Of Personal Narratives -- The Development Of Self -- Piaget's Legacy -- A Different Interpretation -- The Importance Of Emotional Attachment -- Life Stories -- Cognition As Narrative Instrument -- Emotional Interlude -- The Social Construction Of Emotion -- Appraisal Theories Of Emotion -- The Continuum Hypothesis -- Cortical Emotions -- Multiple Processing Systems -- Dynamic Dual Systems : A Speculative Hypothesis -- Unconscious Mental Life -- Mental Content -- An Intelligent Unconscious? -- A Dumb Unconscious -- Philosopher's Redux -- Unconscious Narratives And Unconscious Selves -- Multiplex And Multiple Selves -- Questioning The Continuum View Of Dissociative Disorders -- Multiplex Selves -- Unconstrained Storytelling -- Implications -- Life At The Borders -- Weak Wills -- Addictions -- Addiction As A Life-habit -- Self-control -- Tourette's Syndrome And Other Assorted Tics -- Death, Violence And The Myth Of Autonomy -- The Assumption Of Autonomy -- Rational Suicide -- Violence And The Prefrontal Cortex -- Whither Autonomy? Valerie Gray Hardcastle. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [161]-179) And Index. Content: On being a person -- Personhood -- Re-identification -- Characterization -- Whither narrativity -- Persons vs. selves redux -- Against narrativity -- Clive and the Pirahã : narrative counter-examples? -- Self stories -- A brief and skewed primer on narratology -- The point of nonliterary nonfiction -- The structure of self narratives -- The function of personal narratives -- The development of self -- Piaget's legacy -- A different interpretation -- The importance of emotional attachment -- Life stories -- Cognition as narrative instrument -- Emotional interlude -- The social construction of emotion -- Appraisal theories of emotion -- The continuum hypothesis -- Cortical emotions -- Multiple processing systems -- Dynamic dual systems : a speculative hypothesis -- Unconscious mental life -- Mental content -- An "intelligent" unconscious? -- A "dumb" unconscious -- Philosopher's redux -- Unconscious narratives and unconscious selves -- Multiplex and multiple selves -- Questioning the continuum view of dissociative disorders -- Multiplex selves -- Unconstrained storytelling -- Implications -- Life at the borders -- Weak wills -- Addictions -- Addiction as a life-habit -- Self-control -- Tourette's syndrome and other assorted tics -- Death, violence and the myth of autonomy -- The assumption of autonomy -- Rational suicide -- Violence and the prefrontal cortex -- Whither autonomy? On being a person Personhood Re-identification Characterization Whither narrativity Persons vs. selves redux Against narrativity Clive and the pirahã : narrative counter-examples Self stories A brief and skewed primer on narratology The point of nonliterary nonfiction The structure of self narratives The function of personal narratives The development of self Piaget's legacy A different interpretation The importance of emotional attachment Life stories Cognition as narrative instrument Emotional interlude The social construction of emotion Appraisal theories of emotion The continuum hypothesis Constructing the self Cortical emotions Multiple processing systems Dynamic dual systems : a speculative hypothesis Unconscious mental life Mental content An intelligent unconscious A dumb unconscious Philosopher's redux Unconscious narratives and unconscious selves Multiplex and multiple selves Questioning the continuum view of dissociative disorders Multiplex selves Unconstrained storytelling Implications Life at the borders Weak wills Addictions Addiction as a life-habit Self-control Tourette's syndrome and other assorted tics Death, violence, and the myth of autonomy The assumption of autonomy Rational suicide Violence and the prefrontal cortex Whither autonomy. __Constructing the Self__ • What are the connections between our interpretations, selfhood, and conscious phenomenal experience? • Why do we believe that our interpretations of our life-defining events are narrative in nature? • From the myriad of thoughts, actions, and emotions which constitute our experiences, how do we choose what is interpretively important, the tiny subset that composes the self?By synthesizing the different approaches to understanding the self from philosophy of mind, developmental psychology, psychopathology, and cognitive science, this monograph gives us deeper insight into what being minded, being a person, and having a self are, as well as clarifies the difference and relation between conscious and unconscious mental states and normal and abnormal minds. The explication also affords new perspectives on human development and human emotion. (Series A) "Constructing the Self analyzes the narrative conception of self, filling a serious gap in philosophy and grounding discussion in other disciplines. By synthesizing the different approaches to understanding the self from philosophy of mind, developmental psychology, psychopathology, and cognitive science, this monograph gives us deeper insight into what being minded, being a person, and having a self are, as well as clarifies the difference and relation between conscious and unconscious mental states and normal and abnormal minds. The explication also affords new perspectives on human development and human emotion."--BOOK JACKET