Essays on Perceptual Experience

A central figure in Anglo-American philosophy for over four decades, Paul F. Snowdon made seminal contributions to the fields of metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and the history of twentieth-century philosophy. Snowdon's work on perception and perceptual experience--much of which is collected in this volume for the first time--was particularly influential and firmly established 'disjunctivism' as a view with which any theorist working in the field must reckon. In the essays collected in the first part of this volume, Snowdon traces the contours of the concept of perception, refining his formulation of the disjunctivist position, determining the degree of involvement of the concept of causation, and engaging critically with arguments which aim to support sense-data theories. The second part contains critical examinations of the views propounded by several influential philosophers, amounting to a partial sketch of the history of twentieth-century philosophy of perception. Among the figures whose work Snowdon engages are J. L. Austin, A. J. Ayer, Michael Ayers, Michael Hinton, John McDowell, G. E. Moore, H. H. Price, Wilfrid Sellars, P. F. Strawson, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The volume opens with a robust and intellectually generous introduction in which Snowdon describes the theoretical challenges, approaches, and themes that animate the set of interrelated problems addressed across all sixteen essays. Sprinkled throughout are an array of candid reflections that serve to illuminate both the substantive connections between the essays as well as the historical and circumstantial contexts that occasioned their writing. Cover Essays on Perceptual Experience Copyright Contents Preface Acknowledgements Introduction Perceptual Experiences Philosophy and Perception Disjunctivism Conceptual Analysis Sense-Data and the Nature of Perception Philosophers Part 1: Issues 1: Perception, Vision and Causation I II III IV V VI 2: The Objects of Perceptual Experience I. The Causal Theory and Its Alternatives II. The Simple Argument III. The Role of the Disjunctive Thesis IV. A Problem for This Disjunctive Idea V. Against the Causal Theory VI. An Alternative Account VII. Vision and Function VIII. Conclusion 3: How to Interpret ‘Direct Perception’ I. Introduction II. Three Approaches III. Some Constraints IV. Epistemological Interpretations of ‘Direct Perception’ V. A Non-Epistemological Interpretation of ‘Direct Perception’ VI. Clarifications and Objections VII. The Options VIII. Direct Perception and Epistemology IX. The Argument from Illusion: The Humean Paradigm X. Some General Remarks XI. The Spreading Step XII. Two Other Arguments XIII. Conclusion 4: What Is Realism? I. Ayers’s Task and the Framework i. Idealism ii. The Scholastic-Cartesian Framework II. Direct Realism i. The Scepticism Argument ii. The Bracketing Argument iii. The Essential Role of Intrinsically Contentful Subjectivity in Cognition III. Ayers’s Answer IV. Conclusion 5: The Formulation of Disjunctivism A Response to Fish I. The Need to Attend to the Formulation of Disjunctivism II. Fish’s Suggested Formulation III. An Alternative Approach i. The Thesis of Disjunctivism ii. Disjunctivism and Disjunctions iii. Disjunctivism and Naïve Realism iv. Disjunctivism and Knowledge IV. Conclusion 6: Some Reflections on an Argument from Hallucination I. The Traditional Argument from Hallucination II. Strengthening the Argument III. The Significance of (A) IV. Robinson’s Argument and Some Comments on It V. A Minor Modification VI. Dualism and the Argument VII. Soteriou’s Response VIII. Focusing on (1) IX. Revising the Outer Conception X. Conclusion 7: McDowell on Scepticism, Disjunctivism, and Transcendental Arguments I. McDowell’s Disjunctivism 1 II. McDowell’s Disjunctivism 2 III. Blackburn’s Objections IV. The Transcendental Argument V. Brief Conclusion 8: On the What-It-Is-Like-ness of Experience I. Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Experience II. What-It-Is-Like-ness and Experience III. Preliminary Responses IV. Likeness: What It Is Not Doing Here V. Likeness: What It Is Doing Here VI. Some Responses and More Evidence VII. What It Is Like Being an F VIII. Conclusion 9: Perceptual Concepts as Non-Causal Concepts I. Some Clarifications II. Causal Concepts III. Perceiving and Causal Factors IV. Child’s Arguments V. Conclusion 10: Sense-Data I. The Dominant Sense-Datum Model II. Some Aspects of the Dominant Model III. Moore’s Interpretation of Sense-Data IV. Ayer’s Use V. Epistemology and Ontology VI. Arguments for the Dominant Model VII. Problems for the Dominant Model VIII. Conclusion Part 2: PHILOSOPHERS 11: G. E. Moore on Sense-Data and Perception I. Moore’s Framework II. Moore on Surfaces and Seeing III. The Status of Sense-Data IV. Moore’s Neutral Conception of Sense-Data V. Conclusion 12: Private Experience and Sense Data I. Background: Wittgenstein as a Negative Philosopher II. Wittgenstein’s Conception of Sense Data III. Sense Data and Experience Differences IV. The “Visual Room” V. Seeing As: Two Arguments VI. Interim Conclusions and Transitions VII. Private Experiences: The Question and the Target VIII. Some Theses and Arguments IX. Some Elements: §§244–55 X. Some Elements: §§270–315 XI. Conclusion 13: Austin on the Philosophy of Perception I. Austin on Perception II. Some Specific Issues III. Ayer’s Approach IV. Austin’s Approach V. Conclusion 14: Some Sellarsian Myths I. Sellars’s Objectives and Some Questions II. The “Classical Concept of a Sense-Datum” III. Two Other Arguments IV. Interim Conclusions V. Sellars on Perceptual Concepts and Inner Episodes VI. Conclusion 15: Hinton and the Origins of Disjunctivism I. Disjunctivism as a Commitment of Naïve Realism II. Hinton’s Disjunctions III. The Overall Structure of Hinton’s Discussion IV. Some Comments on Stage (I) V. Hinton’s Target and His Objections to R-Reports VI. Hinton’s Treatment of E-Reports and Some More Questions VII. Conclusion 16: Strawson on the Concept of Perception I. Preamble: Strawson as Tutor II. Strawson on Perception III. The Arguments for the Causal Analysis IV. The Rationale for (or Explanation of) the Causal Condition V. The Exclusion of Capricious Wills VI. Range and Obstruction VII. An Alternative Proposal Works by Paul Snowdon Books Articles, Chapters, and Longer Essays Reviews and Shorter Essays Interviews and Lectures References Index