Challenges the orthodox account of Hegelian phenomenology as hyper-rationalism, arguing that Hegel's insistence on the primacy of experience in the development of scientific knowledge amounts to a kind of empiricism, or inductive epistemology.Hegel's Transcendental Induction challenges the orthodox account of Hegelian phenomenology as a hyper-rationalism, arguing that Hegel's insistence on the primacy of experience in the development of scientific knowledge amounts to a kind of empiricism, or inductive epistemology. While the inductive element does not exclude an emphasis on deductive demonstration as well, Hegel's phenomenological description of knowledge demonstrates why knowing becomes scientific only to the extent that it recognizes its dependence on experience.Simpson's argument closely parallels Hegel's own in the Phenomenology of Spirit, highlighting those sections, like Hegel's analysis of mastery and slavery, that contribute to the argument that knowing is both vulnerable and responsive to the way in which experience resists our attempts to make sense of things. Simpson's argument connects his account of Hegelian phenomenology with traditional accounts of induction, and with a number of other commentators.Peter Simpson is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Laurentian University. Cover Title Publication Data Contents Introduction 1. The Experience of Conscious Life Introduction Sensuous Certainty Perception Conclusion 2. Understanding, Desiring, and Death Introduction The Experience of Understanding The Emergence of Thinking The Realm of Law and the Role of Appearance The Crisis of the Understanding Desiring Self-Consciousness The Concept of Life as Desire In-Itself Life and Natural Consciousness Desire For-Itself as Natural Self-Consciousness Conclusion 3. Induction and the Experience of the Singular Self Introduction The Experience of the Life of Slavery The Experience of the Institution of Slavery The Experience of Slavery Conclusion 4. The Experience of the Institutional Self Introduction The Experience of Sittlichkeit The Experience of Bildung Morality and Conscience Conclusion 5. Induction and the Experience of Phenomenology Introduction Forgiveness, Phenomenology, and Absolute Knowing The Unity of Induction and Deduction Implications for Reading Hegel Conclusion Notes Introduction 1. The Experience of Conscious Life 2. Understanding, Desiring, and Death 3. Induction and the Experience of the Singular Self 4. The Experience of the Institutional Self 5. Induction and the Experience of Phenomenology Bibliography Name Index Back Cover Hegel's Transcendental Induction challenges the orthodox account of Hegelian phenomenology as a hyper-rationalism, arguing that Hegel's insistence on the primacy of experience in the development of scientific knowledge amounts to a kind of empiricism, or inductive epistemology. While the inductive element does not exclude an emphasis on deductive demonstration as well, Hegel's phenomenological description of knowledge demonstrates why knowing becomes scientific only to the extent that it recognizes its dependence on experience. Simpson's argument closely parallels Hegel's own in the Phenomenology of Spirit, highlighting those sections, like Hegel's analysis of mastery and slavery, that contribute to the argument that knowing is both vulnerable and responsive to the way in which experience resists our attempts to make sense of things. Simpson's argument connects his account of Hegelian phenomenology with traditional accounts of induction, and with a number of other commentators.
