Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness (Jean Nicod Lectures)

Physicalism is the idea that if everything that goes on in the universe is physical, our consciousness and feelings must also be physical. Ever since Descartes formulated the mind-body problem, a long line of philosophers has found the physicalist view to be preposterous. According to John Perry, the history of the mind-body problem is, in part, the slow victory of physical monism over various forms of dualism. Each new version of dualism claims that surely something more is going on with us than the merely physical. In this book Perry defends a view that he calls antecedent physicalism. He takes on each of three major arguments against physicalism, showing that they pose no threat to antecedent physicalism. These arguments are the zombie argument (that there is a possible world inhabited by beings that are physically indiscernible from us but not conscious), the knowledge argument (that we can know facts about our own feelings that are not just physical facts, thereby proving physicalism false), and the modal argument (that the identity of sensation and brain state is contingent, but since there is no such thing as contingent identity, sensations are not brain states). Series Foreword......Page 13 Preface......Page 15 1 Experience and Neo-Dualism......Page 19 2 Sentience and Thought......Page 43 3 Thoughts about Sensations......Page 63 4 The Zombie Argument......Page 89 5 The Knowledge Argument......Page 111 6 Recognition and Identification......Page 135 7 What Mary Learned......Page 163 8 The Modal Argument......Page 187 Notes......Page 227 References......Page 231 Index......Page 237

a Defense Of Antecedent Physicalism, Which Argues Against The Idea That If Everything That Goes On In The Universe Is Physical, Our Consciousness And Feelings Must Also Be Physical.

In his typical style, Perry articulates some of the most important issues in philosophy of consciousness and the questions surrounding the philosophical zombie. The episode in Fantastic Voyage assumes that it is conceivable that one might observe, using one's physical senses, a thought or experience of another.