Mind Design and Minimal Syntax

This book introduces generative grammar as an area of study and asks what it tells us about the human mind. Wolfram Hinzen lays the foundation for the unification of modern generative linguistics with the philosophies of mind and language. He introduces Chomsky's program of a "minimalist" syntax as a novel explanatory vision of the human mind. He explains how the Minimalist Program originated in work in cognitive science, biology, linguistics, and philosophy, and examines its implications for work in these fields. He considers the way the human mind is designed when seen as an arrangement of structural patterns in nature, and argues that its design is the product not so much of adaptive evolutionary history as of principles and processes that are ahistorical and internalist in character. Linguistic meaning, he suggests, arises in the mind as a consequence of structures emerging on formal rather than functional grounds. From this he substantiates an unexpected and deeply unfashionable notion of human nature. Clearly written in nontechnical language and assuming a limited knowledge of the fields it examines and links, Minimal Mind Design will appeal to a wide range of scholars in linguistics, philosophy, and cognitive science. It also provides an exceptionally clear insight into the nature and aims of Chomsky's Minimalist Program.

This book introduces generative grammar as an area of study and asks what it tells us about the human mind. Wolfram Hinzen lays the foundation for the unification of modern generative linguistics with the philosophies of mind and language. He introduces Chomsky's program of a minimalist syntax as a novel explanatory vision of the human mind. He explains how the Minimalist Program originated in work in cognitive science, biology, linguistics, and philosophy, and examines its implications for work in these fields. He considers the way the human mind is designed when seen as an arrangement of structural patterns in nature, and argues that its design is the product not so much of adaptive evolutionary history as of principles and processes that are ahistorical and internalist in character. Linguistic meaning, he suggests, arises in the mind as a consequence of structures emerging on formal rather than functional grounds. From this he substantiates an unexpected and deeply unfashionable notion of human nature.

Clearly written in nontechnical language and assuming a limited knowledge of the fields it examines and links, Minimal Mind Design will appeal to a wide range of scholars in linguistics, philosophy, and cognitive science. It also provides an exceptionally clear insight into the nature and aims of Chomsky's Minimalist Program.

Contents......Page 8 Preface......Page 10 Acknowledgements......Page 16 Part I: Naturally Human......Page 18 1.1 Humans as natural objects......Page 20 1.2 The study of human nature......Page 28 1.3 Human design......Page 41 1.4 The fate of human nature in the twentieth century......Page 49 2.1 From methodological to metaphysical naturalism......Page 72 2.2 Rationalist method from Galileo to Chomsky......Page 83 2.3 Double standards......Page 96 3.1 Biology before unification......Page 106 3.2 Mind as function: A critique......Page 112 3.3 God or natural selection or ...?......Page 122 3.4 Epilogue on explanation and necessity......Page 127 Part II: Deducing Variation......Page 132 4.1 Language growth......Page 134 4.2 Language and communication......Page 145 4.3 Language as a social construct......Page 156 5.1 What is syntax?......Page 167 5.2 Explanation in linguistic theory......Page 178 5.3 Human phrase structure......Page 187 5.4 Transforming the phrase......Page 211 5.5 Why is there movement?......Page 225 5.6 The proper interpretation of LF/SEM......Page 237 Part III: Rational Mind......Page 254 6.1 Phases and cascades: Beyond LF......Page 256 6.2 Epistemology for mental organs......Page 267 Conclusions......Page 289 References......Page 295 E......Page 312 N......Page 313 Y......Page 314 Wolfram Hinzen introduces generative grammar and asks what it tells us about the human mind. He argues that the mind is the product not of adaptive evolutionary history but of principles and processes that are ahistorical and internalist. In this chapter I develop the idea of a 'science' of human nature, conceived in much the same way as the Enlightenment and Cartesian naturalists understood it.