Moral Sentimentalism

## Abstract There has been a great deal of interest in moral sentimentalism in recent years, but most of that interest has been exclusively either in metaethical questions about the meaning of moral terms or in normative issues about benevolence, caring, and compassion and their place in the moral life. This book seeks to deal with both sorts of issues and to do so primarily in terms of the notion of empathy. Hume tried to do something like this more than two centuries ago, though he didn't have the word empathy and used the term sympathy instead. But Hume misconstrued the phenomenology of moral approval and disapproval, and the nascent theories of moral meaning he grounded in approval and disapproval allow for (much) less objectivity than moral judgments seem to possess. The present book uses a semi‐Kripkean reference‐fixing view of terms like right and wrong to show how moral claims can be objectively valid a priori and yet at the same time action‐guiding and motivating — something that Kantian ethics seeks to provide, but sentimentalism turns out to be more capable of giving us. In addition to dealing with semantic issues, this book shows how sentimentalist forms of moral education and moral learning are possible; and in its later chapters, it also focuses on normative issues of public morality: discussing respect, autonomy, justice, and objectivity itself in strictly sentimentalist care‐ethical terms and demonstrating that such an approach can be thoroughly feminist in its implications and goals. Rationalism now dominates the scene in moral philosophy, but there are signs of change, and this book works to encourage those possibilities.

There has recently been a good deal of interest in moral sentimentalism, but most of that interest has been exclusively either in metaethical questions about the meaning of moral terms or in normative issues about benevolence and/or caring and their place in morality. In Moral Sentimentalism Michael Slote attempts to deal with both sorts of issues and to do so, primarily, in terms of the notion or phenomenon of empathy. Hume sought to do something like this over two centuries ago, though he didn't have the term empathy and used sympathy instead; and in effect Slote is seeking to give moral sentimentalism a second wind in and for contemporary circumstances. By relying systematically on empathy in its account of normative morality and in what it has to say about the meaning of moral vocabulary, Moral Sentimentalism offers a unified overall ethical picture that can then be tested against ethical rationalism. Rationalism has recently dominated the scene in ethics, but by showing how sentimentalism can make coherent and intuitive sense of such preferred rationalist notions as autonomy, respect, and justice—and by showing how a sentimentalism based in empathy can deal with ethically significant aspects of the moral life that rationalism tends to ignore or skimp on—Slote hopes a wider and more active debate between rationalism and sentimentalism can be set in motion. There are signs that sentimentalist modes of thought are gaining new footholds on the way ethics is done, and this new book is very hopeful about these possibilities.

"There has recently been a good deal of interest in moral sentimentalism, but most of that interest has been exclusively either in meta-ethical questions about the meaning of moral terms or in normative issues about benevolence and/or caring and their place in morality. In Moral Sentimentalism Michael Slote attempts to deal with both sorts of issues and to do so, primarily, in terms of the notion or phenomenon of empathy." "Hume sought to do something like this over two centuries ago, though he didn't have the term "empathy" and used "sympathy" instead. Slote therefore attempts to give moral sentimentalism a second wind. By relying so systematically on empathy in its account of normative morality and in what it has to say about the meaning of moral vocabulary, Slote offers a unified overall ethical picture that can then be tested against ethical rationalism." "Rationalism has recently dominated the scene in ethics, but by showing how sentimentalism can make coherent and intuitive sense of such preferred rationalist notions as autonomy, respect, and justice - and by showing how a sentimentalism based in empathy can deal with ethically significant aspects of the moral life that rationalism tends to ignore or skimp on - Slote hopes a wider and more active debate between rationalism and sentimentalism can be set in motion. There are signs that sentimentalist modes of thought are gaining new footholds on the way ethics is done, and this new book is very hopeful about these possibilities."--Jacket Introduction Empathy : cement of the moral universe Introducing empathy Empathy, partiality, and morality Moral approval and disapproval Empathy in moral judgment A new kind of reference-fixing How to derive "ought" from "is" The use of moral judgments Between motive and morality Paternalism and patriarchy Respect Autonomy When is paternalism lustified? Justice The empathy in justice Distributive social justice International and global justice Empathy, objectivity, and rationality The focus of empathy Objectivity based in empathy Objectivity and empathic concern Relational objectivity Reason, emotion, and science. Contents......Page 14 Introduction......Page 18 1. Empathy: Cement of the Moral Universe......Page 28 2. Moral Approval and Disapproval......Page 42 3. Empathy in Moral Judgment......Page 60 4. A New Kind of Reference-Fixing......Page 72 5. How to Derive “Ought” from “Is”......Page 84 6. The Use of Moral Judgments......Page 98 7. Between Motive and Morality......Page 112 8. Paternalism and Patriarchy......Page 122 9. Justice......Page 138 10. Empathy, Objectivity, and Rationality......Page 156 Conclusion......Page 174 E......Page 176 P......Page 177 Z......Page 178 Contents 14 Introduction 18 1. Empathy: Cement of the Moral Universe 28 2. Moral Approval and Disapproval 42 3. Empathy in Moral Judgment 60 4. A New Kind of Reference-Fixing 72 5. How to Derive “Ought” from “Is” 84 6. The Use of Moral Judgments 98 7. Between Motive and Morality 112 8. Paternalism and Patriarchy 122 9. Justice 138 10. Empathy, Objectivity, and Rationality 156 Conclusion 174 Index 176 A 176 B 176 C 176 D 176 E 176 F 177 G 177 H 177 I 177 J 177 K 177 L 177 M 177 N 177 O 177 P 177 R 178 S 178 T 178 U 178 V 178 W 178 Z 178 There has been a good deal of interest in moral sentimentalism in recent years, but most of that interest has been exclusively either in meta-ethical questions or in normative issues about caring or benevolence. This book presents a systematic revival of moral sentimentalism across both normative and meta-ethical issues.