Natural Goodness

## Abstract Philippa Foot sets out a naturalistic theory of ethics, which she calls ‘natural normativity’ and which is radically opposed to the subjectivist, non‐naturalism tradition deriving from David Hume and to be found in G. E. Moore and modern theories of ethics influenced by Moore, such as emotivism and prescriptivism. Natural normativity involves a special form of evaluation that predicates goodness and defect to living things qua living things, and Foot argues that this is the form of evaluation in moral judgements. Moral evaluations thus share a conceptual structure with evaluations of the characteristics and operations of living things, and can only be understood in these terms. The thesis of the book, then, is that vice is a natural defect, and virtue goodness of will; therefore propositions to do with goodness or badness in human character and action are not to be understood in psychological terms. In Ch. 1, Foot discusses and criticizes the subjectivism and non‐cognitivism that has dominated the past 60 years of analytical moral philosophy. Ch. 2 provides a sketch of an account of natural normativity in plants and animals, while Ch. 3 applies this to human beings, including a discussion of Elizabeth Anscombe's discussion of promising. Ch. 4 exhibits the constraint that this account of natural normativity imparts to any adequate view of practical rationality. Ch. 5 attempts to dissolve any meaningful distinction between the domain of practical rationality and the domain of morality. Ch. 6 deals with the connection between goodness and happiness, while Ch. 7 discusses Nietzsche's immoralism. Philippa Foot has for many years been one of the most distinctive and influential thinkers in moral philosophy. Long dissatisfied with the moral theories of her contemporaries, she has gradually evolved a theory of her own that is radically opposed not only to emotivism and prescriptivism but also to the whole subjectivist, anti-naturalist movement deriving from David Hume. Dissatisfied also with both Kantian and utilitarian ethics, she claims to have isolated a special form of evaluation that predicates goodness and defect only to living things considered as such: she finds this form of evaluation in moral judgements. Her vivid discussion ranges over topics such as practical rationality, erring conscience, and the relation between virtue and happiness, ending with a critique of Nietzsche's immoralism. Natural Goodness is the long-awaited exposition of a highly original approach to moral philosophy, representing a fundamental break away from the assumptions of recent debates. Foot challenges many prominent philosophical arguments and attitudes; hers is not, however, a work of dry theory, but full of life and feeling, written for anyone intrigued by the deepest questions about goodness and human life. This beautifully written book offers a new beginning for moral philosophy. Philippa Foot Has For Many Years Been One Of The Most Distinctive And Influential Thinkers In Moral Philosophy. Long Dissatisfied With The Moral Theories Of Her Contemporaries, She Has Gradually Evolved A Theory Of Her Own That Is Radically Opposed Not Only To Emotivism And Prescriptivism But Also To The Whole Subjectivist, Anti-naturalist Movement Deriving From David Hume. Dissatisfied Also With Both Kantian And Utilitarian Ethics, She Claims To Have Isolated A Special Form Of Evaluation That Predicates Goodness And Defect Only To Living Things Considered As Such: She Finds This Form Of Evaluation In Moral Judgements. Her Vivid Discussion Ranges Over Topics Such As Practical Rationality, Erring Conscience, And The Relation Between Virtue And Happiness, Ending With A Critique Of Nietzsche's Immoralism. This Work Is An Exposition Of An Approach To Moral Philosophy, Which Represents A Fundamental Break Away From The Assumptions Of Previous Debates.--jacket. A Fresh Start -- Natural Norms -- Transition To Human Beings -- Practical Rationality -- Human Goodness -- Happiness And Human Good -- Immoralism. Philippa Foot. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [117]-121) And Index. Also Available On The Internet To Subscribing Institutions.

Philippa Foot has for many years been one of the most distinctive and influential thinkers in moral philosophy. Long dissatisfied with the moral theories of her contemporaries, she has gradually evolved a theory of her own that is radically opposed not only to emotivism and prescriptivism but also to the whole subjectivist, anti-naturalist movement deriving from David Hume. Dissatisfied with both Kantian and utilitarian ethics, she claims to have isolated a special form of evaluation that predicates goodness and defect only to living things considered as such; she finds this form of evaluation in moral judgements. Her vivid discussion covers topics such as practical rationality, erring conscience, and the relation between virtue and happiness, ending with a critique of Nietzsche's immoralism. This long-awaited book exposes a highly original approach to moral philosophy and represents a fundamental break from the assumptions of recent debates. Foot challenges many prominent philosophical arguments and attitudes; but hers is a work full of life and feeling, written for anyone intrigued by the deepest questions about goodness and human.

"Philippa Foot has for many years been one of the most distinctive and influential thinkers in moral philosophy. Long dissatisfied with the moral theories of her contemporaries, she has gradually evolved a theory of her own that is radically opposed not only to emotivism and prescriptivism but also to the whole subjectivist, anti-naturalist movement deriving from David Hume. Dissatisfied also with both Kantian and utilitarian ethics, she claims to have isolated a special form of evaluation that predicates goodness and defect only to living things considered as such: she finds this form of evaluation in moral judgements. Her vivid discussion ranges over topics such as practical rationality, erring conscience, and the relation between virtue and happiness, ending with a critique of Nietzsche's immoralism. This work is an exposition of an approach to moral philosophy, which represents a fundamental break away from the assumptions of previous debates."--BOOK JACKET Preface......Page 2 Introduction......Page 3 1 A Fresh Start?......Page 5 2 Natural Norms......Page 18 3 Transition to Human Beings......Page 26 4 Practical Rationality......Page 35 5 Human Goodness......Page 44 6 Happiness and Human Good......Page 54 7 Immoralism......Page 65 Postscript......Page 76 Bibliography......Page 77