This book focuses on three problems: In what way are rules normative, and how do they differ from ordinary reasons? What makes normative systems systematic? What distinguishes legal systems, and in what consists their normativity? All three questions are answered by taking reasons as the basic normative concept, and showing the distinctive role reasons have in every case, thus paving the way to a unified account of normativity. Rules are a structure of reasons to perform the required act and an exclusionary reason not to follow some competing reasons. Exclusionary reasons are explained, and used to unlock the secrets of orders, promises, and decisions as well as rules. Games are used to exemplify normative systems. Inevitably, the analysis extends to some aspects of normative discourse, which is truth-apt, but with a diminished assertoric force. Copyright Contents Introduction 1 On reasons for action 1.1 On the Structure of Reasons 1.2 Exclusionary Reasons 2 Mandatory norms 2.1 The Practice Theory of Norms 2.2 Reasons and Rules—the Basic Model 2.3 The Analysis of Mandatory Norms 3 Non-mandatory norms 3.1 Permissions 3.2 Power-Conferring Norms 4 Normative systems 4.1 On Some Types of Normative Systems 4.2 Institutionalized Systems: Preliminary Remarks 4.3 Institutionalized Systems: An Analysis 5 Legal systems 5.1 The Uniqueness of Law 5.2 Law and Force 5.3 Law and Morality 5.4 The Normativity of Law Postscript to the Second Edition: Rethinking exclusionary reasons Reasons to Act for a Reason Exclusionary Reasons Conflicts of Reasons Exclusionary Reasons and Rules: The Conceptual Argument Rules and Commitment: Justificatory Arguments Notes and references Introduction Chapter 1 On the structure of reasons Chapter 2 Mandatory Norms Chapter 3 Non-Mandatory Norms Chapter 4 Normative Systems Chapter 5 Legal Systems Postscript to the Second Edition: Rethinking Exclusionary Reasons Index In What Way Are Rules Normative, And How Do They Differ From Ordinary Reasons? What Makes Normative Systems Systematic? What Distinguishes Legal Systems, And In What Consists Their Normativity? Joseph Raz Answers These Three Questions By Taking Reasons As The Basic Normative Concept, And Showing The Distinctive Role Reasons Have In Every Case, Thus Paving The Way To A Unified Account Of Normativity.--from Publisher Website On Reasons For Action -- Mandatory Norms -- Non-mandatory Norms -- Normative Systems -- Legal Systems. Joseph Raz. Previous Editions Published: London : Hutchinson & Co., 1975 ; Princeton, N.j.: Princeton University Press, 1990. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [200]-217) And Index.
