Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge

Julia Tanney offers a sustained criticism of today’s canon in philosophy of mind, which conceives the workings of the rational mind as the outcome of causal interactions between mental states that have their bases in the brain. With its roots in physicalism and functionalism, this widely accepted view provides the philosophical foundation for the cardinal tenet of the cognitive sciences: that cognition is a form of information-processing. __Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge__ presents a challenge not only to the cognitivist approach that has dominated philosophy and the special sciences for the last fifty years but, more broadly, to metaphysical-empirical approaches to the study of the mind. Responding to a tradition that owes much to the writings of Davidson, early Putnam, and Fodor, Tanney challenges this orthodoxy on its own terms. In untangling its internal inadequacies, starting with the paradoxes of irrationality, she arrives at a view these philosophers were keen to rebut—one with affinities to the work of Ryle and Wittgenstein and all but invisible to those working on the cutting edge of analytic philosophy and mind research today. This is the view that rational explanations are embedded in “thick” descriptions that are themselves sophistications upon ever ascending levels of discourse, or socio-linguistic practices. Tanney argues that conceptual cartography rather than metaphysical-scientific explanation is the basic tool for understanding the nature of the mind. __Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge__ clears the path for a return to the world-involving, circumstance-dependent, normative practices where the rational mind has its home.

Julia Tanney offers a sustained criticism of today’s canon in philosophy of mind, which conceives the workings of the rational mind as the outcome of causal interactions between mental states that have their bases in the brain. With its roots in physicalism and functionalism, this widely accepted view provides the philosophical foundation for the cardinal tenet of the cognitive sciences: that cognition is a form of information-processing. Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge presents a challenge not only to the cognitivist approach that has dominated philosophy and the special sciences for the last fifty years but, more broadly, to metaphysical-empirical approaches to the study of the mind.

Responding to a tradition that owes much to the writings of Davidson, early Putnam, and Fodor, Tanney challenges this orthodoxy on its own terms. In untangling its internal inadequacies, starting with the paradoxes of irrationality, she arrives at a view these philosophers were keen to rebut—one with affinities to the work of Ryle and Wittgenstein and all but invisible to those working on the cutting edge of analytic philosophy and mind research today. This is the view that rational explanations are embedded in “thick” descriptions that are themselves sophistications upon ever ascending levels of discourse, or socio-linguistic practices.

Tanney argues that conceptual cartography rather than metaphysical-scientific explanation is the basic tool for understanding the nature of the mind. Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge clears the path for a return to the world-involving, circumstance-dependent, normative practices where the rational mind has its home.

Julia Tanney offers a sustained criticism of today's canon in philosophy of mind, which conceives the workings of the rational mind as the outcome of causal interactions between mental states that have their bases in the brain. With its roots in physicalism and functionalism, this widely accepted view provides the philosophical foundation for the cardinal tenet of the cognitive sciences: that cognition is a form of information-processing. Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge presents a challenge not only to the cognitivist approach that has dominated philosophy and the special sciences for the last fifty years but, more broadly, to metaphysical-empirical approaches to the study of the mind. Responding to a tradition that owes much to the writings of Davidson, early Putnam, and Fodor, Tanney challenges this orthodoxy on its own terms. In untangling its internal inadequacies, starting with the paradoxes of irrationality, she arrives at a view these philosophers were keen to rebut--one with affinities to the work of Ryle and Wittgenstein and all but invisible to those working on the cutting edge of analytic philosophy and mind research today. This is the view that rational explanations are embedded in thick descriptions that are themselves sophistications upon ever ascending levels of discourse, or socio-linguistic practices. Tanney argues that conceptual cartography rather than metaphysical-scientific explanation is the basic tool for understanding the nature of the mind. Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge clears the path for a return to the world-involving, circumstance-dependent, normative practices where the rational mind has its home.--book jacket Contents 8 Introduction 12 I. Rules and Normativity 32 1. De-Individualizing Norms of Rationality (1995) 34 2. Normativity and Thought (1999) 57 3. Playing the Rule-Following Game (2000) 74 4. Real Rules (2008) 99 II. Reason-Explanation and Mental Causation 112 5. Why Reasons May Not Be Causes (1995) 114 6. Reason-Explanation and the Contents of the Mind (2005) 144 7. Reasons as Non-Causal, Context-Placing Explanations (2009) 160 8. Pain, Polio, and Pride: Some Reflections on “Becausal” Explanations 182 III. Philosophical Education and Cognitive Science 198 9. How to Resist Mental Representations (1998) 200 10. On the Conceptual, Psychological, and Moral Status of Zombies, Swamp-Beings, and Other “Behaviorally Indistinguishable” Creatures (2004) 219 11. Conceptual Analysis, Theory Construction, and Philosophical Elucidation in the Philosophy of Mind 237 12. Ryle’s Regress and the Philosophy of Cognitive Science (2011) 260 IV. Self-Knowledge 288 13. Some Constructivist Thoughts about Self-Knowledge (1996) 290 14. Self-Knowledge, Normativity, and Construction (2002) 311 15. Speaking One’s Mind (2007) 333 16. Conceptual Amorphousness, Reasons, and Causes 345 Acknowledgments 370 Provenance of Essays 372 Index 376 Frontmatter -- Contents -- Introduction -- 1. De-Individualizing Norms of Rationality (1995) -- 2. Normativity and Thought (1999) -- 3. Playing the Rule-Following Game (2000) -- 4. Real Rules (2008) -- 5. Why Reasons May Not Be Causes (1995) -- 6. Reason-Explanation and the Contents of the Mind (2005) -- 7. Reasons as Non-Causal, Context-Placing Explanations (2009) -- 8. Pain, Polio, and Pride: Some Reflections on "Becausal" Explanations -- 9. How To Resist Mental Representations (1998) -- 10. On The Conceptual, Psychological, And Moral Status Of Zombies, Swamp-Beings, And Other "Behaviorally Indistinguishable" Creatures (2004) -- 11. Conceptual Analysis, Theory Construction, and Philosophical Elucidation in the Philosophy of Mind -- 12. Ryle's Regress and the Philosophy of Cognitive Science (2011) -- 13. Some Constructivist Thoughts about Self-Knowledge (1996) -- 14. Self-Knowledge, Normativity, and Construction (2002) -- 15. Speaking One's Mind (2007) -- 16. Conceptual Amorphousness, Reasons, and Causes -- Acknowledgments -- Provenance of Essays -- Index. Main description: Tanney challenges not only the cognitivist approach that has dominated philosophy and the special sciences for fifty years, but metaphysical-empirical approaches to the mind in general. Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge advocates a return to the world-involving, circumstance-dependent, normative practices where the rational mind has its home.