Self and Other : Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame

Can you be a self on your own or only together with others? Is selfhood a built-in feature of experience or rather socially constructed? How do we at all come to understand others? Does empathy amount to and allow for a distinct experiential acquaintance with others, and if so, what does that tell us about the nature of selfhood and social cognition? Does a strong emphasis on the first-personal character of consciousness prohibit a satisfactory account of intersubjectivity or is the former rather a necessary requirement for the latter?Engaging with debates and findings in classical phenomenology, in philosophy of mind and in various empirical disciplines, Dan Zahavi's new book __Self and Other__ offers answers to these questions. Discussing such diverse topics as self-consciousness, phenomenal externalism, mindless coping, mirror self-recognition, autism, theory of mind, embodied simulation, joint attention, shame, time-consciousness, embodiment, narrativity, self-disorders, expressivity and Buddhist no-self accounts, Zahavi argues that any theory of consciousness that wishes to take the subjective dimension of our experiential life serious must endorse a minimalist notion of self. At the same time, however, he also contends that an adequate account of the self has to recognize its multifaceted character, and that various complementary accounts must be integrated, if we are to do justice to its complexity. Thus, while arguing that the most fundamental level of selfhood is not socially constructed and not constitutively dependent upon others, Zahavi also acknowledges that there are dimensions of the self and types of self-experience that are other-mediated. The final part of the book exemplifies this claim through a close analysis of shame. Can You Be A Self On Your Own Or Only Together With Others? Is Selfhood A Built-in Feature Of Experience Or Rather Socially Constructed? How Do We At All Come To Understand Others? Does Empathy Amount To And Allow For A Distinct Experiential Acquaintance With Others, And If So, What Does That Tell Us About The Nature Of Selfhood And Social Cognition? Does A Strong Emphasis On The First-personal Character Of Consciousness Prohibit A Satisfactory Account Of Intersubjectivity Or Is The Former Rather A Necessary Requirement For The Latter? Engaging With Debates And Findings In Classical Phenomenology, In Philosophy Of Mind And In Various Empirical Disciplines, Dan Zahavi's New Book Self And Other Offers Answers To These Questions. Discussing Such Diverse Topics As Self-consciousness, Phenomenal Externalism, Mindless Coping, Mirror Self-recognition, Autism, Theory Of Mind, Embodied Simulation, Joint Attention, Shame, Time-consciousness, Embodiment, Narrativity, Self-disorders, Expressivity And Buddhist No-self Accounts, Zahavi Argues That Any Theory Of Consciousness That Wishes To Take The Subjective Dimension Of Our Experiential Life Serious Must Endorse A Minimalist Notion Of Self. At The Same Time, However, He Also Contends That An Adequate Account Of The Self Has To Recognize Its Multifaceted Character, And That Various Complementary Accounts Must Be Integrated, If We Are To Do Justice To Its Complexity. Thus, While Arguing That The Most Fundamental Level Of Selfhood Is Not Socially Constructed And Not Constitutively Dependent Upon Others, Zahavi Also Acknowledges That There Are Dimensions Of The Self And Types Of Self-experience That Are Other-mediated. The Final Part Of The Book Exemplifies This Claim Through A Close Analysis Of Shame. Conflicting Perspectives Of Self -- Consciousness, Self-consciousness, And Selfhood -- Transparency And Anonymity -- Subjectivity And Selfhood -- Self And Diachronic Unity -- Pure And Poor -- A Multidimensional Account -- Subjectivity And Intersubjectivity -- Empathy And Projection -- Phenomenology Of Empathy -- Empathy And Social Cognition -- Subjectivity And Otherness -- The Self As Social Object -- Shame -- You, Me, And We. Dan Zahavi. Includes Bibliographical References (pages [251]-274) And Indexes. Cover 1 Self and Other 4 Copyright 5 Acknowledgements 6 Contents 8 Introduction: Genesis and Structure 10 Part I: The Experiential Self 16 1: Conflicting Perspectives on Self 18 2: Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Selfhood 25 3: Transparency and Anonymity 40 4: Subjectivity or Selfhood 57 4.1 The illusory self 57 4.2 Normativity and narrativity 66 5: Self and Diachronic Unity 78 6: Pure and Poor 93 6.1 Privacy and anonymity 93 6.2 The personal I, the pure I, and the primal I 95 6.3 The solipsism of lived experience 101 7: A Multidimensional Account 103 Part II: Empathic Understanding 108 8: Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity 110 9: Empathy and Projection 114 10: Phenomenology of Empathy 127 10.1 Phenomenological misgivings 127 10.2 Scheler 130 10.3 Husserl and Stein 138 10.3.1 The preoccupation of a lifetime 138 10.3.2 Empathy and perception 140 10.3.3 Coupling and analogical transference 147 10.3.4 The objects and levels of empathy 152 10.4 Schutz 156 10.5 The phenomenological proposal 161 11: Empathy and Social Cognition 168 11.1 Mirror neurons and embodied simulation 168 11.2 The role of context 178 11.3 The invisibility claim 185 11.4 The spectre of behaviourism 195 12: Subjectivity and Otherness 203 Part III: The Interpersonal Self 210 13: The Self as Social Object 212 13.1 Neuroscientific complications 212 13.2 Facial self-recognition and mirrors 213 14: Shame 223 14.1 Shame and self-consciousness 223 14.2 Varieties of shame 227 14.3 Others in mind 231 14.4 Standards and evaluations 238 14.5 Developmental considerations 243 14.6 The shamed self 250 15: You, Me, and We 256 References 266 Index of Names 290 Index of Subjects 293