Using Reichenbach's (1947) theory of tenses and temporal structures as a point of departure, McGilvray modifies it to produce a theory of his own. Analysing the difficulties Reichenbach's theory has in explaining the relationship of a speaker to a world, he introduces a new model for this relationship based on the three-interval temporal topology that Reichenbachian theory assigns to the sentences of natural languages. McGilvray explains and defends in detail Reichenbach's theory of tense and temporal structure, criticising and rejecting the major rival theory, found in tense logic. He also applies Reichenbach's nonstandard topology to English, showing that it is correct for the language. A significant aspect of McGilvray's study is the supplementing of Reichenbach's topology by including speakers, sentences, situations, and things spoken about with the temporal intervals. McGilvray relocates and reinterprets a prime source of faulty intuitions concerning time and tense -- our feeling that the past, present, and future must be thought of in terms of the settled, the immediate, and the unsettled. He uses his theory to explain the temporal and semantic structure of complex constructions in English, including propositional attitudes, modals, and conditionals. As well, he adapts the structure that Reichenbach's theory assigns to sentences to the aspects perfective (complete) and imperfective (incomplete). The novel view of temporal and semantic structure developed by McGilvray touches on virtually all the puzzles concerning the philosophy of language -- meaning and meaningfulness, the nature of reference, truth, propositions, and worldmaking. His emphasis is on how the speaker, by articulating sentences and understanding them, is both free and constrained -- free to describe something which can be located at any time and in any world, but constrained by the beliefs, evidence, information, and commitments held or made at the time of speech. Contents......Page 8 Acknowledgments......Page 14 Introduction......Page 18 1 THE BASIC TEMPORAL AND SEMANTIC STRUCTURE OF SENTENCES......Page 26 1.1.1 Temporal Structure......Page 27 1.1.2 Reichenbach's 1947 Formalism......Page 31 1.1.3 The 1947 Topology Supplemented......Page 35 1.1.4 The Natures of Speakers, Tokens, "Perceiver-Describers," Companions, and Situations......Page 37 1.1.5 Persons, Competence, Groups, and Locations......Page 43 1.2.1 Adverbials and Simple Sentences......Page 51 1.2.2 The Future Tense......Page 54 1.2.3 The Anterior and Posterior......Page 61 1.3.1 Tense Logic and the SE Relationship......Page 63 1.3.2 SE Relationships and the Consequences of Tenses......Page 69 2 COMPLEX SITUATIONS......Page 76 2.1 Propositional Attitudes......Page 77 2.1.1 The Structure in Detail......Page 80 2.1.2 An Epistemic Matter: Responsibility and Tense......Page 83 2.2 Modals, Epistemic and Root......Page 91 2.2.1 Root Modals......Page 92 2.2.2 Epistemic Modals......Page 95 2.3 'When'......Page 102 2.3.1 Conditioned Root Modals......Page 111 2.4 Iterative States: Habituals, Nomics, and Generalizations......Page 114 2.4.1 The Structure......Page 116 2.4.2 The Nomic Difference......Page 120 2.5 Conditionals and Arguments......Page 128 2.5.1 The Structure of the Standard Conditional......Page 130 2.5.2 The Subjunctive and Counterfactual Conditionals......Page 137 2.5.3 Arguments, Conditioned Root-Modal Iteratives, and the Storytelling "We"......Page 144 2.5.4 Conditionals, (A)s, Truth, and Scepticism......Page 152 3 MEANING, MEANINGFULNESS, AND REFERENCE......Page 160 3.1 Meaning and Meaningfulness......Page 161 3.2 Truth Conditions and Meaning......Page 163 3.3 Meaning as Referring......Page 172 3.3.1 Indexicality......Page 173 3.3.2 Exemplificational Reference to t, i[sub(s)], and p; Ties......Page 176 3.3.3 On Referring: Picturing Situations......Page 179 3.3.4 On Chomsky's Contribution......Page 184 3.3.5 Just Slightly More Than Syntax and Lexicon; Public Meanings......Page 187 3.3.6 Means-Sentences......Page 191 3.3.7 Meaning, Publicity, and Scepticism......Page 192 3.4 Semantics and World: Double Constructivism......Page 193 4 REFERENCE......Page 197 4.2 Picture Reference......Page 198 4.2.1 Recognizing and Classifying......Page 199 4.2.2 Synonymy and Analyticity......Page 202 4.2.3 Meaning Change......Page 206 4.2.4 Proper Names......Page 209 4.2.5 Complex Pictures......Page 212 4.3 Identifying Reference......Page 216 4.3.1 Other Views: Preliminary Remarks......Page 217 4.3.2 Salience for ψ......Page 220 4.3.3 Reidentification......Page 226 4.3.4 Identifying Reference and the Autonomy of Contents......Page 230 4.4 Demonstrative Reference......Page 235 5.1 Existence: An Overview......Page 237 5.1.2 Towards a Criterion of Existence......Page 239 5.1.3 The Platonic Gambit......Page 243 5.1.4 Existence Sentences......Page 245 5.2 Mathematical Sentences, the Existence of Numbers, and Mathematical Truth......Page 247 6 SITUATIONS AND ASPECTS......Page 259 6.1 Situations......Page 260 6.1.1 Movements......Page 263 6.1.2 Processes (Including Activities)......Page 265 6.1.3 Changes......Page 267 6.1.4 States......Page 270 6.2 Imperfectives and Perfectives of Situations with Bounds......Page 271 6.3 Imperfectives and Perfectives of Situations without Bounds......Page 275 6.3.1 Simple States......Page 276 6.3.2 Scheduling States......Page 283 6.3.4 Propositional Attitude States (and Processes)......Page 286 6.4 Discourse Effects of the Perfective and Imperfective of Situations with Bounds......Page 291 6.5 REs (Contents) and Perfectives and Imperfectives......Page 294 7.1 Content Competence: Picture-Referential and Attention Groups......Page 298 7.1.1 The Limits of Meaning: How Many Propositions Are There?......Page 299 7.2 The Evidence and Storytelling Groups......Page 306 7.2.1 Forces......Page 307 7.2.2 Truth: Time, Tense, and Storytelling......Page 312 7.2.3 A Theory of Force?......Page 331 7.3 Constructivism......Page 334 7.4 Worldmaking Reconceived: Projective Illusions......Page 338 Notes......Page 340 Bibliography......Page 376 C......Page 386 G......Page 387 M......Page 388 R......Page 389 S......Page 390 W......Page 391
Using Reichenbach's (1947) theory of tenses and temporal structures as a point of departure, McGilvray modifies it to produce a theory of his own. Analysing the difficulties Reichenbach's theory has in explaining the relationship of a speaker to a world, he introduces a new model for this relationship based on the three-interval temporal topology that Reichenbachian theory assigns to the sentences of natural languages. McGilvray explains and defends in detail Reichenbach's theory of tense and temporal structure, criticising and rejecting the major rival theory, found in tense logic. He also applies Reichenbach's nonstandard topology to English, showing that it is correct for the language. A significant aspect of McGilvray's study is the supplementing of Reichenbach's topology by including speakers, sentences, situations, and things spoken about with the temporal intervals. McGilvray relocates and reinterprets a prime source of faulty intuitions concerning time and tense — our feeling that the past, present, and future must be thought of in terms of the settled, the immediate, and the unsettled. He uses his theory to explain the temporal and semantic structure of complex constructions in English, including propositional attitudes, modals, and conditionals. As well, he adapts the structure that Reichenbach's theory assigns to sentences to the aspects perfective (complete) and imperfective (incomplete). The novel view of temporal and semantic structure developed by McGilvray touches on virtually all the puzzles concerning the philosophy of language — meaning and meaningfulness, the nature of reference, truth, propositions, and worldmaking. His emphasis is on how the speaker,by articulating sentences and understanding them, is both free and constrained — free to describe something which can be located at any time and in any world, but constrained by the beliefs, evidence, information, and commitments held or made at the time of speech.
