The Somme

In the long history of the British Army, the Battle of the Somme was its bloodiest encounter. Between July 1 and mid-November 1916, 432,000 of its soldiers became casualties--about 3,600 for every day of battle. German casualties were far fewer despite British superiority in the air and in lethal artillery. What went wrong for the British, and who was responsible? Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson have examined the entire public archive on the Battle of the Somme to reconstruct the day-by-day course of the war. The result is the most precise and authentic account of the campaign on record and a book that challenges almost every received view of the battle. The colossal rate of infantry casualties in fact resulted from inadequate fire support; responsibility for tactical mistakes actually belonged to the High Command and the civilian War Committee. Field-Marshall Haig, the records show, was repeatedly deficient in strategy, tactics, command, and organization. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers died for a cause that lacked both a coherent military plan and responsible political leadership. Prior and Wilson decisively change our understanding of the history of the Western Front. Contents 3 Maps 6 Acknowledgements 7 1. The Context 9 2. ‘Absolutely Astonishing’: The War Committee and the Military 20 3. Decision-making, January–February 23 4. Decision-making, March–June 33 5. ‘Grasping at the Shadow’: Planning for the Somme, February–June 43 6. ‘Favourable Results Are Not Anticipated’: Preparations for Battle, June 65 7. ‘A Short Life’: VII & VIII Corps on 1 July 79 8. ‘The Enemy’s Fire Was So Intense’: X Corps on 1 July 91 9. ‘Wave after Wave Were Mown Down’: III Corps on 1 July 99 10. ‘Cowering Men in Field Grey’: XV and XIII Corps on 1 July 109 11. Reflections on 1 July 120 12. ‘Ill-Considered Attacks on a Small Front’, 2–13 July 127 13. ‘Cavalry Sharpening Their Swords’, 14 July 139 14. ‘We Are a Bit Stuck’, 15–31 July 149 15. ‘Something Wanting in the Methods Employed’, 1 August–12 September 165 16. ‘A Hell of a Time’: Pozières and Mouquet Farm, July–August 181 17. Summary: 15 July–12 September 194 18. The Politicians and the Somme Campaign, July–August 199 19. One Division’s Somme: The First Division, July–September 211 20. ‘An Operation Planned on Bolder Lines’: Tanks and the 15 September Plan 224 21. Lumbering Tanks: The Battle of 15 September 237 22. 25 September 247 23. ‘The Tragic Hill of Thiepval’,1 26–30 September 257 24. ‘A Severe Trial of Body and Spirit’: The Somme, October 269 25. ‘We Must Keep Going!’: The Politicians and the Somme Campaign, September–October 287 26. The Political Battle: Beaumont Hamel, 13–19 November 297 27. Reflections on the British at the Somme 308 Epilogue:The End of It All, November 1916 318 Notes 324 Bibliography 351 Index 360

In the long history of the British Army, the Battle of the Somme was its bloodiest encounter. Between July 1 and mid-November 1916, 432,000 of its soldiers became casualties--about 3,600 for every day of battle. German casualties were far fewer despite British superiority in the air and in lethal artillery.

What went wrong for the British, and who was responsible? Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson have examined the entire public archive on the Battle of the Somme to reconstruct the day-by-day course of the war. The result is the most precise and authentic account of the campaign on record and a book that challenges almost every received view of the battle. The colossal rate of infantry casualties in fact resulted from inadequate fire support; responsibility for tactical mistakes actually belonged to the High Command and the civilian War Committee. Field-Marshall Haig, the records show, was repeatedly deficient in strategy, tactics, command, and organization. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers died for a cause that lacked both a coherent military plan and responsible political leadership. Prior and Wilson decisively change our understanding of the history of the Western Front.

"In the long history of the British Army, the Battle of the Somme was its bloodiest encounter. Between 1 July and mid-November 1916, 432,000 of its soldiers became casualties -- about 3,600 for every day of battle. German casualties, it is estimated, were far fewer -- probably 230,000 -- even though the British possessed superiority in the air and in artillery, the most lethal weapon on the Western Front." "What went wrong for the British, and who was responsible? Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson have examined the entire public archive covering the Somme campaign in 1916 and reconstruct the day-by-day course of the war. The colossal rate of infantry casualties was not the result of defects in the infantry itself, but the inadequacy of the fire support. Responsibility for tactical mistakes was not that of the brigadiers or divisional commanders, but of the High Command and the civilian War Committee. Field-Marshall Haig is shown as repeatedly deficient in strategy, tactics, command and organisation." "Hundreds of thousands of soldiers lay down their lives in a campaign which lacked both a coherent military plan and responsible political leadership."--Jacket >This analysis of the decision-making that led to the Somme offensive is "a major addition to the literature on the military history of the Great War." (Jay Winter, author of The Great War in History ) Despite superior air and artillery power, British soldiers died in catastrophic numbers at the Battle of Somme in 1916. What went wrong, and who was responsible? This book meticulously reconstructs the battle, assigns responsibility to military and political leaders, and changes forever the way we understand this encounter and the history of the Western Front. "A magisterial piece of scholarship. . . . It is a model of historical research and should do much to further our understanding of the Great War and how it was fought." —Contemporary Review "Revisionist history at its best." —Library Journal (starred review)