Understanding General Deterrence : Theory and Application

"This book bridges the divide between formal and quantitative studies of deterrence by empirically testing and extending perfect deterrence theory. The author focuses on general deterrence, which relates to managing relations between states at all times, not only during crises. This distinction is important because understanding general deterrence is more important than understanding immediate deterrence, and because empirical analyses of immediate deterrence can be misleading due to selection effects. In a series of formal and quantitative analyses, the author tests perfect deterrence theory, applies the theory to explain recurrent conflict, and develops a new three-party game of extended deterrence."--Provided by publisher Cover 1 Half-Title 2 Title 3 Copyright 4 Contents 6 List of Figures and Tables 7 Preface 9 Chapter 1 Understanding General Deterrence 11 Chapter 2 General Deterrence Case Selection 31 Chapter 3 Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory 50 Chapter 4 Three-Party Extended Deterrence 84 Chapter 5 Settlements, Deterrence, and Recurrent Conflict 115 Chapter 6 Conclusion 142 Appendix 1 FORTRAN Program Used to Determine Active Dyads 155 Appendix 2 Subgame Perfect Equilibria of the Three-Party Extended Deterrence Game 163 Appendix 3 Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the Three-Party Extended Deterrence Game 178 Notes 178 References 194 Index 207 Front Matter....Pages i-xii Understanding General Deterrence....Pages 1-20 General Deterrence Case Selection....Pages 21-39 Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory....Pages 41-74 Three-Party Extended Deterrence....Pages 75-105 Settlements, Deterrence, and Recurrent Conflict....Pages 107-133 Conclusion....Pages 135-147 Back Matter....Pages 149-208