Zero-sum victory : what we're getting wrong about war

Why have the major post-9/11 US military interventions turned into quagmires? Despite huge power imbalances in the United States's favor, significant capacity-building efforts, and repeated tactical victories by what many observers call the world's best military, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq turned intractable. The US government's fixation on zero-sum, decisive victory in these conflicts is a key reason why military operations to overthrow two developing-world regimes failed to successfully achieve favorable and durable outcomes.In Zero-Sum Victory, retired US Army colonel Christopher D. Kolenda identifies three interrelated problems that have emerged from the government's insistence on zero-sum victory. First, the US government has no organized way to measure successful outcomes other than a decisive military victory, and thus, selects strategies that overestimate the possibility of such an outcome. Second, the United States is slow to recognize and modify or abandon losing strategies; in both cases, US officials believe their strategies are working, even as the situation deteriorates. Third, once the United States decides to withdraw, bargaining asymmetries and disconnects in strategy undermine the prospects for a successful transition or negotiated outcome. Relying on historic examples and personal experience, Kolenda draws thought-provoking and actionable conclusions about the utility of American military power in the contemporary world -- insights that serve as a starting point for future scholarship as well as for important national security reforms.ISBN : 9780813152769 Cover Praise for Zero-Sum Victory Halftitle page Title page Copyright page Dedication Contents Illustrations Glossary of Key Actors Introduction What Is War Termination? Gaps in War Termination Scholarship for US Interventions Getting War and War Termination Wrong How This Study Began Methodology A Note on Sources Structure of the Book The Past as Prologue The Vietnam War Part I Toward a War Termination Framework 1 Further Defining War Termination Three Successful War Termination Outcomes in Irregular War Strategy and War Termination How Do Outcomes Fit into Strategy? 2 The Decisive Victory Paradigm Undermines Strategy for Irregular War How Realistic Is Decisive Victory Against Insurgencies? Applying War Termination Concept to Cases Part II The Pursuit of Decisive Victory in Afghanistan 3 Light Footprints to a Long War Overview Reluctant to Get Too Involved One of Many Fronts An Unrealistic Approach 4 Plans Hit Reality A Recent History of Bad Neighbors and Worse Governance The Durand Line and Tensions with Pakistan The Soviet-Afghan War The Afghan Civil War Enter the Taliban Misreading a Complex Situation 5 The Fall of the Taliban and the Bonn Conference A Technocratic Approach Facts on the Ground The Warlords Are Back Consolidating Power in Kabul Gathering Storm 6 America’s Bureaucratic Way of War Institutionalizing Silos: The Lead Nation Concept Setting the Stage for Taliban Resurgence Conclusion to Part II Part III Persisting in a Failing Approach 7 Accelerating Success, 2003–2007 8 Failing to Keep Pace with the Insurgency, 2007–2009 9 The Good War Going Badly 10 Surging into the Good War 11 More Shovels in the Quicksand 12 Misapplying the Iraq Formula 13 Assessments and Risks Conclusion to Part III Overview Part IV Ending the War in Afghanistan 14 Reconciliation versus Transition 15 Reconciling Reconciliation 16 Competing Visions Karzai, Taliban, and Pakistan 17 Exploratory Talks Building and Damaging Confidence 18 Coming Off the Rails 19 Fallout BSA, Bergdahl, and the 2014 Elections Conclusion to Part IV Overview Part V Pursuit of Decisive Victory in Iraq Overview What Went Wrong? 20 Operation Iraqi Freedom Plans without a Strategy 21 A Complicated Approach to a Complex Situation 22 From Decisive Victory to Transition Conclusion to Part V Part VI Staying the Course in Iraq 23 Achieving Milestones While Losing the War 24 Trapped by Partners in a Losing Strategy 25 Mirror Imaging Civil-Military Relations 26 To Surge or Not to Surge A Possible Win Beats a Certain Loss 27 A New Plan on Shaky Foundations Conclusion to Part VI Overview Part VII Ending the War in Iraq Overview 28 The Surge Misunderstood 29 The Absence of a Political Strategy Erodes US Leverage 30 New Administration, Similar Challenges Conclusion to Part VII Part VIII Implications 31 Iraq and Afghanistan Compared 32 Implications for US Foreign Policy 33 Implications for Scholarship Implications for Strategy and Counterinsurgency Understanding and Addressing Political, Bureaucratic, and Patron-Client Frictions Wartime Negotiations and Strategic Bargaining Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary War Abbreviations Key Events in the Afghanistan Conflict Key Events in the Iraq Conflict Notes Acknowledgments Index

The military expert and author of Leadership presents “the most thoughtful analysis yet of America’s recent conflicts—and future challenges” (Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal).
 
Why have the major post-9/11 US military interventions turned into quagmires? Despite huge power imbalances in America’s favor, capacity-building efforts, and tactical victories, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq turned intractable. The US government’s fixation on zero-sum, decisive victory in these conflicts is a key reason why these operations failed to achieve favorable and durable outcomes.
 
In Zero-Sum Victory, retired US Army colonel Christopher D. Kolenda identifies three interrelated problems that have emerged from the government’s insistence on zero-sum victory. First, the US government has no way to measure successful outcomes other than a decisive military victory, and thus, selects strategies that overestimate the possibility of such an outcome. Second, the United States is slow to recognize, modify, or abandon losing strategies. Third, once the United States decides to withdraw, bargaining asymmetries and disconnects in strategy undermine the prospects for a successful transition or negotiated outcome.
 
Relying on historic examples and personal experience, Kolenda draws thought-provoking and actionable conclusions about the utility of American military power in the contemporary world—insights that serve as a starting point for future scholarship as well as for important national security reforms.

Why have the major post-9/11 US military interventions turned into quagmires? Despite huge power imbalances in the United States' favor, significant capacity-building efforts, and repeated tactical victories by what many observers call the world's best military, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq turned intractable. The US government's fixation on zero-sum, decisive victory in these conflicts is a key reason why military operations to overthrow two developing-world regimes failed to successfully achieve favorable and durable outcomes.

In Zero-Sum Victory, retired US Army colonel Christopher D. Kolenda identifies three interrelated problems that have emerged from the government's insistence on zero-sum victory. First, the US government has no organized way to measure successful outcomes other than a decisive military victory, and thus, selects strategies that overestimate the possibility of such an outcome. Second, the United States is slow to recognize and modify or abandon losing strategies; in both cases, US officials believe their strategies are working, even as the situation deteriorates. Third, once the United States decides to withdraw, bargaining asymmetries and disconnects in strategy undermine the prospects for a successful transition or negotiated outcome.

Relying on historic examples and personal experience, Kolenda draws thought-provoking and actionable conclusions about the utility of American military power in the contemporary world—insights that serve as a starting point for future scholarship as well as for important national security reforms.

"Why have the major post-9/11 US military interventions turned into quagmires? Despite huge power imbalances in the United States's favor, significant capacity-building efforts, and repeated tactical victories by what many observers call the world's best military, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq turned intractable. The US government's fixation on zero-sum, decisive victory in these conflicts is a key reason why military operations to overthrow two developing-world regimes failed to successfully achieve favorable and durable outcomes. In Zero-Sum Victory, retired US Army colonel Christopher D. Kolenda identifies three interrelated problems that have emerged from the government's insistence on zero-sum victory. First, the US government has no organized way to measure successful outcomes other than a decisive military victory, and thus, selects strategies that overestimate the possibility of such an outcome. Second, the United States is slow to recognize and modify or abandon losing strategies; in both cases, US officials believe their strategies are working, even as the situation deteriorates. Third, once the United States decides to withdraw, bargaining asymmetries and disconnects in strategy undermine the prospects for a successful transition or negotiated outcome. Relying on historic examples and personal experience, Kolenda draws thought-provoking and actionable conclusions about the utility of American military power in the contemporary world-insights that serve as a starting point for future scholarship as well as for important national security reforms"-- Provided by publisher. The military expert and author of Leadership presents “the most thoughtful analysis yet of America’s recent conflicts—and future challenges” (Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal). Why have the major post-9/11 US military interventions turned into quagmires? Despite huge power imbalances in America’s favor, capacity-building efforts, and tactical victories, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq turned intractable. The US government’s fixation on zero-sum, decisive victory in these conflicts is a key reason why these operations failed to achieve favorable and durable outcomes. In Zero-Sum Victory , retired US Army colonel Christopher D. Kolenda identifies three interrelated problems that have emerged from the government’s insistence on zero-sum victory. First, the US government has no way to measure successful outcomes other than a decisive military victory, and thus, selects strategies that overestimate the possibility of such an outcome. Second, the United States is slow to recognize, modify, or abandon losing strategies. Third, once the United States decides to withdraw, bargaining asymmetries and disconnects in strategy undermine the prospects for a successful transition or negotiated outcome. Relying on historic examples and personal experience, Kolenda draws thought-provoking and actionable conclusions about the utility of American military power in the contemporary world—insights that serve as a starting point for future scholarship as well as for important national security reforms. Why have the major, post-9/11, US military interventions turned into quagmires? Despite huge power imbalances, major capacity-building efforts, and repeated tactical victories by what many observers call the world's best military, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq turned bloody and intractable. The US government's fixation on zero-sum decisive victory is an important part of the explanation why successful military operations to overthrow two developing-world regimes failed to achieve favorable and durable outcomes. 0In Zero-Sum Victory, Christopher D. Kolenda identifies three interrelated problems that have emerged from the government's insistence on a zero-sum victory. First, the US government has no organized way to consider successful outcomes alternative to decisive military victory and, thus, selects strategies that overestimate the prospects of such a victory. Second, the US is slow to recognize and modify or abandon losing strategies. In both cases, US officials believe their strategies are working even as the situations deteriorate. Third, once the US decides to withdraw, bargaining asymmetries and disconnects in strategy undermine the prospects for a successful transition or negotiated outcome. 0By making powerful historic comparisons and drawing from personal experience, Kolenda draws thought-provoking and actionable conclusions about the utility of American military power in the contemporary world