The Phenomenal and the Representational

There are two main ways in which things with minds, like us, differ from things without minds, like tables and chairs. First, we are conscious-there is something that it is like to be us. That is, we instantiate phenomenal properties. Second, we represent, in various ways, our world as being certain ways. That is, we instantiate representational properties. Jeff Speaks attempts to make progress on three questions: What are phenomenal properties? What are representational properties? How are the phenomenal and the representational related? Cover 1 The Phenomenal and the Representational 4 Copyright 5 Dedication 6 Preface 8 Table of Contents 12 PART I: Two Kinds of Properties of Subjects 14 1: Phenomenal Properties 16 2: Representational Properties 21 PART II: From Transparency to Intentionalism 32 3: Varieties of Intentionalism 34 4: Transparency 39 5: Two Impossible Scenarios 48 6: Phenomenism and Phenomenal Variance 54 7: The Interpersonal Constraint, the Time Constraint, and the Memory Constraint 57 The Interpersonal Constraint 57 The Time Constraint 59 The Memory Constraint 62 8: Phenomenal Variance and Property Variance 65 9: Extending the Argument to Other Phenomenal States 68 PART III: Intermodal Intentionalism and Nonconceptual Content 70 10: Belief and Intermodal Intentionalism 72 11: Direct Arguments for Nonconceptualism 78 12: A Dilemma for Fregeanism about Sensed Contents 83 13: Frege’s Puzzle and the Content of Thought 89 Minimal Fregeanism 91 Informative Fregeanism 105 PART IV: The Metaphysics of Representational Properties 110 14: Properties and the Nature of Russellian Contents 112 15: Properties and the Attitudes 121 PART V: Availability and the Scope of Perceptual Representation 132 16: Availability 134 17: Demonstratives and the Availability Requirement 139 18: The Perceptual Representation of Objects 146 19: The Problem of ContingentlyExisting Contents 150 20: The Perceptual Representationof Natural Kinds 156 21: Independence, Fallibility, Anti-Circularity 160 22: Appearance Properties 168 Appearance property-ism, phenomenal variance, and Scenarios A and B 169 Fallibility, Independence, and Availability 171 Anti-Circularity 176 23: Relativist Views of Sensible Qualities 179 PART VI: How Many Phenomenal Relations? 184 24: Phenomenal Relations 186 25: The Distinctions Between the Senses 190 26: Binding and Bodily Sensations 199 27: Shifts in Attention 202 PART VII: Phenomenal Identity and Indiscriminability 214 28: Identifying Phenomenal and Representational Properties 216 29: Phenomenal Content 221 30: Phenomenal Content and Phenomenal Continua 232 31: Perceptual Constancies and Phenomenal Match 239 32: Phenomenal Content and the Representation of Change 245 33: Indiscriminable Phenomenal Properties 248 PART VIII: The Reduction of Phenomenal Properties 254 34: Two Kinds of Theories of Phenomenal Properties 256 35: Functionalist Theories of Content 258 Indication Theories 259 Co-variational Theories 263 Internalist Functionalism 264 Limited Holism 265 36: Functionalist Definitions of Phenomenal Relations 269 37: Identity Theories 276 Phenomenal Properties and Sensing Relations to Contingent Things 276 Distinctness/Discriminability and Multiple Realizability 280 Identity Theories and Perceptual Constancies 281 The Reducibility of Phenomenal Relations 284 Bibliography 286 Index of Names 292 Index of Topics 294 This title is about two kinds of properties of perceiving subjects: their phenomenal properties, and their representational properties. It focuses on three questions: What are phenomenal properties? What are representational properties? What is the relationship between phenomenal and representational properties? Machine generated contents note: pt. I Two Kinds of Properties of Subjects -- 1. Phenomenal Properties -- 2. Representational Properties -- pt. II From Transparency to Intentionalism -- 3. Varieties of Intentionalism -- 4. Transparency -- 5. Two Impossible Scenarios -- 6. Phenomenism and Phenomenal Variance -- 7. The Interpersonal Constraint, the Time Constraint, and the Memory Constraint -- 8. Phenomenal Variance and Property Variance -- 9. Extending the Argument to Other Phenomenal States -- pt. III Intermodal Intentionalism and Nonconceptual Content -- 10. Belief and Intermodal Intentionalism -- 11. Direct Arguments for Nonconceptualism -- 12. A Dilemma for Fregeanism about Sensed Contents -- 13. Frege's Puzzle and the Content of Thought -- pt. IV The Metaphysics of Representational Properties -- 14. Properties and the Nature of Russellian Contents -- 15. Properties and the Attitudes -- pt. V Availability and the Scope of Perceptual Representation -- 16. Availability -- 17. Demonstratives and the Availability Requirement -- 18. The Perceptual Representation of Objects -- 19. The Problem of Contingently Existing Contents -- 20. The Perceptual Representation of Natural Kinds -- 21. Independence, Fallibility, Anti-Circularity -- 22. Appearance Properties -- 23. Relativist Views of Sensible Qualities -- pt. VI How Many Phenomenal Relations? -- 24. Phenomenal Relations -- 25. The Distinctions Between the Senses -- 26. Binding and Bodily Sensations -- 27. Shifts in Attention -- pt. VII Phenomenal Identity and Indiscriminability -- 28. Identifying Phenomenal and Representational Properties -- 29. Phenomenal Content -- 30. Phenomenal Content and Phenomenal Continua -- 31. Perceptual Constancies and Phenomenal Match -- 32. Phenomenal Content and the Representation of Change -- 33. Indiscriminable Phenomenal Properties -- pt. VIII The Reduction of Phenomenal Properties -- 34. Two Kinds of Theories of Phenomenal Properties -- 35. Functionalist Theories of Content -- 36. Functionalist Definitions of Phenomenal Relations -- 37. Identity Theories. Jeff Speaks. Includes bibliographical references and indexes. First, we are conscious-there is something that it is like to be us. That is, we instantiate phenomenal properties. Second, we represent, in various ways, the world around us. That is, we instantiate representational properties. Jeff Speaks attempts to make progress on three questions: What are phenomenal properties? What are representational properties? How are the phenomenal and the representational related? We differ from things without minds in two main ways. First, we are conscious: we instantiate phenomenal properties. Second, we represent our world as being certain ways: we instantiate representational properties. Jeff Speaks explores the nature of phenomenal properties and of representational properties, and the relationship between them.