The Phenomenal Self

Barry Dainton presents a fascinating new account of the self, the key to which is experiential or phenomenal continuity. Provided our mental life continues we can easily imagine ourselves surviving the most dramatic physical alterations, or even moving from one body to another. It was this fact that led John Locke to conclude that a credible account of our persistence conditions - an account which reflects how we actually conceive of ourselves - should be framed in terms of mental rather than material continuity. But mental continuity comes in different forms. Most of Locke's contemporary followers agree that our continued existence is secured by psychological continuity, which they take to be made up of memories, beliefs, intentions, personality traits, and the like. Dainton argues that that a better and more believable account can be framed in terms of the sort of continuity we find in our streams of consciousness from moment to moment. Why? Simply because provided this continuity is not lost - provided our streams of consciousness flow on - we can easily imagine ourselves surviving the most dramatic psychological alterations. Phenomenal continuity seems to provide a more reliable guide to our persistence than any form of continuity. The Phenomenal Self is a full-scale defence and elaboration of this premise.The first task is arriving at an adequate understanding of phenomenal unity and continuity. This achieved, Dainton turns to the most pressing problem facing any experience-based approach: losses of consciousness. How can we survive them? He shows how the problem can be solved in a satisfactory manner by construing ourselves as systems of experiential capacities. He then moves on to explore a range of further issues. How simple can a self be? How are we related to our bodies? Is our persistence an all-or-nothing affair? Do our minds consist of parts which could enjoy an independent existence? Is it metaphysically intelligible to construe ourselves as systems of capacities? The book concludes with a novel treatment of fission and fusion. Contents......Page 6 List of Figures......Page 9 Preface......Page 12 Acknowledgements......Page 27 1.1. Can it be so easy?......Page 28 1.2. Psychological continuity......Page 33 1.3. First doubts......Page 38 1.4. Some varieties of virtual life......Page 41 1.5. Strands untangled......Page 48 2.1. Experience......Page 55 2.2. Phenomenal space......Page 61 2.3. Self and awareness......Page 66 2.4. A superfluous self......Page 69 2.5. Simplicity and unity......Page 73 3.1. A constraint......Page 78 3.2. Memory......Page 80 3.3. Chunks, apprehensions and representations......Page 83 3.4. Overlap and flow......Page 90 3.5. Phenomenal cuts......Page 95 3.6. The one experience view......Page 98 3.7. Streamal unity......Page 100 4.1. Bridge building......Page 102 4.2. Experience-machines and beyond......Page 108 4.3. Power structures......Page 115 4.4. The C-theory......Page 138 4.5. Powers in general......Page 141 4.6. Projection and production......Page 158 5.1. The self in experience......Page 162 5.2. Bridges of resemblance......Page 175 5.3. Fundamentalism......Page 178 5.4. Foster’s modal bridge......Page 180 5.5. Unger’s material bridge......Page 188 6.1. From C-systems to minds......Page 197 6.2. Aspects of mind......Page 198 6.3. Psycho-phenomenal integration......Page 202 6.4. C-relations and P-relations......Page 205 6.5. From a functional perspective......Page 208 6.6. Non-phenomenal selves......Page 215 6.7. What matters......Page 219 7.1. A blurring......Page 228 7.2. Four grades of embodiment......Page 230 7.3. Phenomenal embodiment......Page 233 7.4. Effective embodiment......Page 236 7.5. Boundary disputes......Page 242 7.6. Monist alternatives......Page 251 7.7. Minimalism and possession......Page 254 8.1. Simplicity and isolation......Page 263 8.2. Isolation: strands of a defence......Page 265 8.3. Reductio?......Page 272 8.4. Minimal subjects......Page 276 8.5. A minimal modification, and a moral......Page 278 8.6. Weak unity......Page 281 9.1. Unity and interdependence......Page 291 9.2. Interdependent potentials......Page 293 9.3. Phenomenal interdependence......Page 299 9.4. Organization and interference......Page 300 9.5. C-holism......Page 304 9.6. From C-holism to power holism......Page 316 9.7. Power systematicity......Page 327 9.8. Simplicity......Page 334 10.1. Absoluteness......Page 338 10.2. Some varieties of incapacitation......Page 340 10.3. Brains......Page 343 10.4. Cyclical subjects......Page 346 10.5. Congenial decomposition......Page 348 10.6. Assessments......Page 352 10.7. Deviancy......Page 358 10.8. Teleportation revisited......Page 363 10.9. From Egos to C-systems......Page 365 11.1. Ontological qualms......Page 368 11.2. Issues of substance......Page 369 11.3. Unity and independence......Page 371 11.4. Menacing circularities......Page 375 11.5. Ownership, isolation and holism......Page 381 11.6. Power worlds......Page 386 12.1. Fission......Page 391 12.2. Fission as fatal......Page 395 12.3. Can consciousness divide?......Page 397 12.4. Overlap to the rescue?......Page 400 12.5. Time travel and double existence......Page 405 12.6. Personal and phenomenal time......Page 408 12.7. Non-linearity......Page 412 12.8. Time and times......Page 416 12.9. Issues and objections......Page 420 12.10. Fusion......Page 427 12.11. The many shapes of life......Page 433 13. Appendix: Reductionism......Page 436 Bibliography......Page 445 C......Page 454 D......Page 455 G......Page 456 M......Page 457 P......Page 458 R......Page 459 T......Page 460 Z......Page 461 Barry Dainton presents a fascinating new account of the self, the key to which is experiential or phenomenal continuity. Provided our mental life continues we can easily imagine ourselves surviving the most dramatic physical alterations, or even moving from one body to another. It was this fact that led John Locke to conclude that a credible account of our persistence conditions - an account which reflects how we actually conceive of ourselves - should be framed in terms of mental rather than material continuity. But mental continuity comes in different forms. Most of Locke's contemporary followers agree that our continued existence is secured by psychological continuity, which they take to be made up of memories, beliefs, intentions, personality traits, and the like. Dainton argues that that a better and more believable account can be framed in terms of the sort of continuity we find in our streams of consciousness from moment to moment. Why? Simply because provided this continuity is not lost - provided our streams of consciousness flow on - we can easily imagine ourselves surviving the most dramatic psychological alterations. Phenomenal continuity seems to provide a more reliable guide to our persistence than any form of continuity. The Phenomenal Self is a full-scale defence and elaboration of this premise. The first task is arriving at an adequate understanding of phenomenal unity and continuity. This achieved, Dainton turns to the most pressing problem facing any experience-based approach: losses of consciousness. How can we survive them? He shows how the problem can be solved in a satisfactory manner by construing ourselves as systems of experiential capacities. He then moves on to explore a range of further issues. How simple can a self be? How are we related to our bodies? Is our persistence an all-or-nothing affair? Do our minds consist of parts which could enjoy an independent existence? Is it metaphysically intelligible to construe ourselves as systems of capacities? The book concludes with a novel treatment of fission and fusion. Barry Dainton Presents An Account Of The Self, Grounded In The Continuity We Find In Our Streams Of Consciousness: This Is The Key To Explaining How We Can Undergo Changes But Remain The Same Person. Mind And Self -- Phenomenal Unity -- Phenomenal Continuity -- Powers And Subjects -- Alternatives -- Minds And Mental Integration -- Embodiment -- Simple Selves -- Holism -- Modes Of Incapacitation -- Objections And Replics -- The Topology Of The Self -- Appendix : Reductionism . Barry Dainton. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [418]-426) And Index. Barry Dainton presents a fascinating new account of the self, grounded in the continuity we find in our streams of consciousness: this is the key to explaining how we can undergo changes but remain the same person. He has original things to say about personal identity, the conditions of our existence and survival, and our relation to our bodies Mind and self Phenomenal unity Phenomenal continuity Powers and subjects Alternatives Minds and mental integration Embodiment Simple selves Holism Modes of incapacitation Objections and reductions The topology of the self.